Section
One: what are the aims of performance measurement?
Clarity in objectives is an essential pre-requisite to developing any system of
performance measurement and review. There are at least two key reasons why government
would want to set performance measures. First, to improve public services; and second, to
reinforce accountability.
Improved public services
A successful system of performance measurement should cause an organisation to
re-assess how it operates, in light of its priorities and on the basis of objective
information.
For individual departments and agencies, performance measures may be valuable for
on-going monitoring purposes, to ensure that services are being provided to the expected
standard.
However for central government, performance measures also provide a tool to drive
forward a change agenda, by asking the departments to consider their own objectives in
light of the government’s stated priorities. For the Treasury, the PSAs enable a
clear link to be established between increased funding and the achievement of key
outcomes, thereby putting the spotlight on improvements to meet Government objectives.
Performance measures may be used to underpin effective working practices across all
departments and agencies. Cross-cutting measures in areas of shared responsibility help to
promote joined-up approaches to service delivery. User-focused measures will prompt
departments to consider how responsive they are to their clients or customers. And
specific government-wide measures – for example on electronic communications -
provide a tool for the centre to ensure that departments and agencies are moving forward
in line with their priorities.
Reinforced accountability
The second key reason for government to set performance measures is to hold departments
and agencies to account for the resources they use and the outcomes they achieve.
Accountability may be at a number of levels:
 | The PSAs provide a vehicle for the Government to set out its strategic objectives to Parliament
and to the wider public. By linking the PSAs to the comprehensive spending review,
Ministers are able to demonstrate that taxpayers’ money is being directed to priority
areas, in line with manifesto commitments. Many departmental performance targets are
included in the government’s Annual Report, reinforcing accountability to the public. |
| Within government, the PSAs enable the Treasury to hold the departments to account for
increased resources arising from the CSR, requiring them to set out in quantifiable terms
how additional investment in, for example, health or education, will lead to improved
outcomes. |
| Within the departments themselves, the PSAs should provide the top line objectives,
beneath which more detailed managerial objectives may be set, thus enabling each
department to reassess its operation in the light of government priorities. |
|
| The key question is "How do you
know when you are getting better?" The publication of Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing
Government in the early 1990s gave a clear rationale for why central government should
measure performance.
It has been recognised that not everything lends itself to precise measurement. It is
often said that "quality" cannot be measured. This should not be an excuse for
not trying; as this paper argues later, partial or proxy measures of quality can be
developed. There is a different argument over the setting of targets; if you cannot
measure all aspects of a service, you must be very alert to the distorting effects an
inappropriate target could generate. These issues are discussed further in the remainder
of this paper. |
Why measure performance?
- What gets measured gets done
- If you don’t measure results, you can’t tell success from failure
- If you can’t see success, you can’t reward it
- If you can’t reward success, you’re probably rewarding failure
- If you can’t see success, you can’t learn from it
- If you can’t recognise failure, you can’t correct it
- If you can demonstrate results, you can win public support.
Osborne & Gaebler, Reinventing Government (1992) |
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